Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform by Shroff, Nemit et al.
DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12022
Journal of Accounting Research
Vol. 51 No. 5 December 2013
Printed in U.S.A.
Voluntary Disclosure and
Information Asymmetry: Evidence
from the 2005 Securities Offering
Reform
NEM I T S H R O F F ,∗ A M Y X . S U N ,† H A L D . W H I T E ,‡
A N D W E I N I N G Z H A N G§
Received 6 January 2010; accepted 23 July 2013
ABSTRACT
In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission enacted the Securities Of-
fering Reform (Reform), which relaxes “gun-jumping” restrictions, thereby
allowing firms to more freely disclose information before equity offerings. We
examine the effect of the Reform on voluntary disclosure behavior before eq-
uity offerings and the associated economic consequences. We find that firms
provide significantly more preoffering disclosures after the Reform. Further,
we find that these preoffering disclosures are associated with a decrease in
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information asymmetry and a reduction in the cost of raising equity capi-
tal. Our findings not only inform the debate on the market effect of the Re-
form, but also speak to the literature on the relation between voluntary disclo-
sure and information asymmetry by examining the effect of quasi-exogenous
changes in voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry, and thus a firm’s
cost of capital.
1. Introduction
In 2005, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted the Se-
curities Offering Reform (Reform), which relaxes restrictions—known as
“gun-jumping” provisions—on firms’ disclosures prior to public equity of-
ferings.1 The SEC states that the Reform will increase the flow of informa-
tion to investors before equity offerings and promote more efficient capital
markets by allowing investors to more accurately value securities while cur-
rent “rules regarding liability and disclosure [e.g., Rule 10b-5] . . . will main-
tain and enhance investor protection in connection with registered secu-
rities offerings” (SEC [2005]). However, opponents of the Reform argue
that the relaxation of these restrictions through safe harbors will increase
managerial incentives to mislead the market (e.g., Morrissey [2007]).2 This
view is echoed in the academic literature, particularly for management fore-
casts given their forward-looking nature. For example, Lang and Lundholm
[2000] suggest firms can use forecasts to hype their stock before issuing eq-
uity absent the gun-jumping regulations.
This paper examines whether firms provide more disclosures immedi-
ately before equity offerings (i.e., during the quiet period) after the Re-
form, and whether the change in preoffering disclosure (if any) is asso-
ciated with reductions in information asymmetry or market conditioning.
Our findings not only speak to the market impact of the Reform, but they
also provide insights into the broader question of whether disclosure re-
strictions are needed before seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Importantly,
our study also contributes to the literature on the relation between volun-
tary disclosure and information asymmetry. Capturing the effect of volun-
tary disclosure on information asymmetry and the cost of capital is difficult
because of the inherent endogeneity in voluntary disclosure choices—that
is, disclosure changes are unlikely to be random events—as well as measure-
ment error in typical cost of capital proxies (see Healy and Palepu [2001],
1 The gun-jumping provisions restrict firms from freely disclosing information before eq-
uity offerings. However, these restrictions are somewhat ambiguous and extend over a vaguely
defined “quiet period” thought to last from the time a firm first contemplates an offering
through the completion of the offering. The provisions are intentionally vague to allow the
SEC greater latitude in pursuing cases it believes to be in violation of gun-jumping rules (Lang
and Lundholm [2000]). We provide more details on the gun-jumping rules and the Reform
in section 2 and the appendix.
2 In this paper, we use the terms “market conditioning” and “hyping” interchangeably. We
define this process as managers using disclosures to inflate prices before offerings to sell shares
at an artificially high price.
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Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]). Our setting allows us to better identify the re-
lation between voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry, and the cost of
capital. Quiet periods before SEOs naturally promote private information
acquisition, leading to information asymmetry among investors. By examin-
ing the removal of quiet period disclosure restrictions, we can observe the
impact of quasi-exogenous changes in voluntary disclosure on information
asymmetry, and thus a firm’s cost of capital. To the extent that disclosure
incentives, firm characteristics, and growth potential before SEOs are simi-
lar before and after the Reform, changes in information asymmetry can be
attributed to the change in disclosure allowed by the Reform. Further, the
SEO setting allows us to capture a more direct cost of (raising) capital, that
is, the negative SEO announcement return.
We begin our analyses by using a difference-in-differences design to ex-
amine whether the Reform leads to more pre-SEO disclosures. Specifically,
we examine the post-Reform change in disclosure behavior of SEO firms
before their SEOs and benchmark the pre-SEO disclosure behavior of SEO
firms to (1) their own disclosure behavior in the neighboring periods, and
(2) the disclosure behavior of a propensity score–matched control sample
over identical periods. We focus on two types of disclosure: (1) forward-
looking disclosures, proxied by management forecasts, and (2) factual in-
formation, proxied by firm-initiated press releases (excluding forecasts).
We find that, before the Reform, equity offering firms reduce their disclo-
sure frequency in the 90 days before the SEO filing date (hereafter, the
“pre-SEO period”). This evidence is consistent with firms observing the
quiet period before SEOs mandated by gun-jumping rules. After the Re-
form, we find that firms increase their pre-SEO disclosure frequency to lev-
els observed in non-SEO periods. In economic terms, SEO firms provide
approximately 36% more pre-SEO forecasts and 17% more pre-SEO press
releases following the Reform.
We then investigate whether managers use their pre-SEO voluntary dis-
closures to condition the market or to reduce information asymmetry.
To identify market-conditioning behavior, we first examine whether there
is a disproportionate increase in the amount of good news released by
managers in the pre-SEO period relative to neighboring periods and the
matched control sample.3 We then investigate whether the stock price in-
creases around the pre-SEO good news disclosures are unwarranted by ex-
amining the association between the pre-SEO good news and post-SEO ab-
normal returns. If the good news disclosures during the pre-SEO period
3 In particular, we calculate both the total number of positive-return disclosures relative to
the total number of negative-return disclosures and the total magnitude of the stock returns
around the disclosures in the pre-SEO period and the two neighboring periods. The intent
of this approach is to directly capture the market reaction to the disclosures as opposed to
subjectively determining the optimism or pessimism in the disclosures (Lang and Lundholm
[2000]), which may or may not relate to price changes since it does not necessarily capture
how investors perceive the disclosure. See section 3.2.1 for a more detailed discussion.
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are related to managerial hyping, we should observe a negative associa-
tion between the pre-SEO good news and the post-SEO abnormal returns.
Our results indicate that firms provide disproportionately more good news
forecasts and press releases during the pre-SEO period after the Reform.
However, we find no evidence of an association between pre-SEO good
news disclosures and post-SEO abnormal returns. These results suggest that
pre-SEO voluntary disclosures are not associated with market-conditioning
behavior.4
Next, we investigate whether the changes in pre-SEO voluntary disclo-
sures are associated with changes in information asymmetry. Specifically, we
examine the change in the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads,
market depths (i.e., order size), and analyst forecast accuracy during the
pre-SEO period after the Reform. Using a difference-in-differences design
similar to that used in our previous analyses, we find that the Reform leads
to a significant decrease (increase) in preoffering spreads (depths and an-
alyst accuracy). In terms of economic magnitudes, our coefficients suggest
that spreads decrease by approximately 16.7% and depth and analyst fore-
cast accuracy increase by approximately 8% and 15%, respectively, in pre-
SEO periods after the Reform. Further, the information asymmetry levels in
pre-SEO periods return to normal levels observed in non-SEO periods af-
ter the Reform. This is consistent with the Reform allowing firms to provide
disclosures that reduce information asymmetry before equity offerings.
To provide stronger evidence that the Reform affects pre-SEO disclo-
sure behavior and information asymmetry, we exploit a regulatory distinc-
tion introduced in the Reform between firms considered to be well-known
seasoned issuers (WKSIs) and other firms (non-WKSIs). The Reform al-
lows WKSIs to make any disclosures, including “offers” (as defined in Sec-
tion 5(c) of the Securities Act), at any time before and after the filing of
a registration statement. Non-WKSIs, on the other hand, are allowed to re-
lease any information as long as it is more than 30 days before the registration
statement is filed and the disclosure does not reference the equity offer-
ing. However, in the 30 days immediately before SEO filings, non-WKSIs
are prohibited from making Section 5(c) “offers.” Given that the SEC in-
terprets “offers” very broadly to include any disclosure that arouses public
interest, the disclosures made by non-WKSIs in the 30 days preceding SEO
filing are more susceptible to claims of gun-jumping violations. We find
that WKSIs disclose more information up to the SEO filing date, whereas
non-WKSIs do not disclose information in the 30 days immediately preced-
ing SEO filings. Rather, non-WKSIs increase disclosure up until the 30 days
4 The lack of evidence supporting market-conditioning behavior could be because either
managers do not attempt to hype or investors debias managerial disclosures upon SEO an-
nouncement. We provide additional evidence supporting the former in section 5.2. We also
note that our return reversal tests have limited power due to a small sample size and measure-
ment error in our proxies; thus, any inference must be drawn with caution. We discuss this
further in section 5.2.
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before SEO filings. Further, we find that the change in pre-SEO disclosure
frequency is associated with a change in information asymmetry for WKSIs
and non-WKSIs. Specifically, the reduction in information asymmetry for
WKSIs and non-WKSIs coincides in time with the increases in disclosure
(i.e., non-WKSIs have a reduction in information asymmetry up until the
30 days before the SEO filing, but not in the 30 days immediately preced-
ing the SEO filing, whereas WKSIs have reduced information asymmetry
up through the SEO filing). These results provide strong evidence that the
Reform increased pre-SEO disclosure behavior and thus lowered pre-SEO
information asymmetry.
Finally, we examine whether the Reform reduced the cost of raising capi-
tal as evidenced by changes in the SEO announcement returns (Korajczyk,
Lucas, and McDonald [1991], Lang and Lundholm [2000]). Prior research
finds robust evidence that the announcement of an SEO induces a negative
2%–3% return, on average, which is interpreted as the cost of adverse selec-
tion due to information asymmetry between managers and investors (Myers
and Majluf [1984], Ritter [2003], Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli [2007]). How-
ever, if firms reduce information asymmetry through disclosure before SEO
announcements, the announcement returns should be less negative after
the Reform. We find that the SEO announcement return is approximately
0.7% less negative after the Reform, consistent with a large reduction in the
cost of issuing equity capital following the enactment of the Reform.
In sum, we find robust evidence that firms increase their voluntary dis-
closure before SEOs following the Reform and the increased disclosure re-
duces pre-SEO information asymmetry and the overall cost of raising capi-
tal. Although we cannot definitively show that firms do not hype their stock
using pre-SEO disclosures, we note that both the reduction in information
asymmetry and cost of capital are difficult to reconcile with hyping behav-
ior, and, as such, complement our direct tests showing no evidence of pre-
SEO hyping.
Our findings provide several contributions. First, our evidence informs
the debate on the market impact of the Reform, which is considered by
some to be the “most dramatic change in the way U.S. securities are mar-
keted since the introduction of the 1933 Securities Act” (EuroWeek [2004]).
Our results support the SEC’s removal of the restrictions designed to com-
bat market conditioning. Although firms provide more frequent voluntary
disclosures, we find no evidence of market conditioning, but rather a re-
duction in information asymmetry and the cost of raising capital (i.e., less
negative offering announcement returns).
Second, our evidence contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature
by documenting a reduction in information asymmetry and the cost of
raising equity capital following a quasi-exogenous shock to voluntary dis-
closure restrictions before equity offerings. Further, we examine a more
comprehensive set of firm disclosures, that is, management forecasts and
press releases, to document the economic consequences of voluntary dis-
closure. Healy and Palepu [2001, p. 426] note that prior studies often use
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management forecasts alone as a voluntary disclosure proxy, but point out
that the “findings may not generalize to other forms of voluntary disclo-
sure.” We extend the literature on the economic consequences of voluntary
disclosure by examining both press releases and management forecasts.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the role of voluntary disclosure
before SEOs. Prior research shows that firms in the early 1980s (Frankel,
McNichols, and Wilson [1995]) and 1992 (Lang and Lundholm [2000])
are no more likely to provide management forecasts before an equity offer-
ing than they are to do so in other periods. However, Lang and Lundholm
[2000] find increased disclosure of factual business information and op-
timism in press releases before equity offerings. As Lang and Lundholm
[2000] note, the lack of evidence related to higher forecast frequency be-
fore SEOs may simply be a result of the explicit discouragement in the gun-
jumping rules. We contribute to these studies by showing that the relaxation
of the gun-jumping rules by the Reform results in both more frequent fore-
casts and more firm-initiated press releases and that these disclosures are
associated with reductions in information asymmetry.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses
the background and hypotheses development, section 3 discusses research
design, section 4 presents the sample selection, section 5 presents the em-
pirical results, and we conclude the paper in section 6.
2. Background
2.1 DISCLOSURE REGIME CHANGE
2.1.1. Pre-Reform Disclosure Regime. SEOs can provide incentives for man-
agers to inflate prices through firm disclosures to extract rents from
purchasing investors at issuance. Recognizing the ripe setting for ad-
verse selection, Congress included rules (known as “gun-jumping” laws)
in Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of [1933] that prohibit firms from
conditioning the market by significantly restricting their disclosure activity
prior to equity offerings.
5 Lang and Lundholm [2000] find evidence of pre-SEO hyping in 1992; however, we find no
evidence of pre-SEO hyping in our sample period. Unfortunately, because the authors hand
collect the disclosures for the 41 small, industrial firms in 1992, we do not replicate and rec-
oncile our results to theirs using their approach. However, we note that Shroff et al. [2013]
provide evidence that helps reconcile our findings with Lang and Lundholm [2000]. Specifi-
cally, they document a shift in hyping behavior following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX) in 2002. They note that the Reform suggests that improvements in firms’ informa-
tion environment brought about by advances in mandatory disclosure rules, namely SOX,
and broader information dissemination have helped discipline managers from hyping (SEC
[2005]). They go on to show that firms hype their stock before the enactment of SOX, which
is consistent with Lang and Lundholm [2000]. However, after SOX, they find no evidence of
hyping and conclude that the new information environment may have disciplined hyping, as
the SEC suggests.
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Section 5(c) of the Securities Act prohibits any “offer” to sell a security
prior to filing a registration statement with the SEC. Since the time of this
regulation, the definition of “offer” has grown to include any act that might
“contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest
in the issuer” (SEC release no. 3844). The restriction period is known as
the “quiet period” and, although not defined by federal securities laws,
is thought to run from the time an issuer contemplates an offering until
the sale is completed (Lang and Lundholm [2000]). Further, intent of dis-
closure is irrelevant, as the SEC views any disclosure that has the effect of
conditioning the market as a violation of Section 5(c). As a result, it was
difficult to determine what constituted a violation of these rules, which led
firms to reduce the frequency of even their regular disclosures before eq-
uity offerings to minimize the risk of violating gun-jumping provisions (SEC
[1958]).6
Although the SEC permitted firms to issue regularly disclosed informa-
tion regarding “factual business and financial developments” before the Re-
form, it discouraged atypical disclosures. For example, Choi and Pritchard
[2008] propose that shifting an existing advertising campaign from a trade
journal into the Wall Street Journal during the quiet period may be problem-
atic under the Securities Act Release No. 5180 (October, 1971). Moreover,
the Commission discouraged firms from disclosing soft and unverifiable
information (e.g., forward-looking information) during the quiet period.7
Thus, offering firms faced a conflict between raising equity capital on fa-
vorable terms and gun-jumping laws.
2.1.2. Post-Reform Disclosure Regime. In 2005, the SEC enacted the Securi-
ties Offering Reform, which relaxes gun-jumping restrictions. The Reform
provides increased certainty regarding when gun-jumping provisions will
be inapplicable to firms’ communication. Specifically, Rule 163A provides a
safe harbor for any communication made up to 30 days prior to the filing
of the registration statement as long as firms do not refer to the securi-
ties offering, thereby clarifying when the “quiet period” begins. Further,
6 In referring to the ambiguity surrounding gun-jumping rules at the 1958 Investment
Bankers Association Annual Convention, then SEC Chairman, Edward Gadsby, states “From
the very nature of the statute, which attributes very great importance to the subjective intent
of the parties, it is completely impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for general applica-
tion to this question” (SEC [1958], p. 13). In the same speech, Edward Gadsby refers to the
concern that firms are withholding regularly released information for fear of violating gun-
jumping provisions. Specifically, he states that, “It has also been indicated to us that, in spite
of our repeated efforts to clarify our understanding of the effect which the provisions of Sec-
tion 5 have upon such [i.e., disclosure] activities, there still remain serious doubts as to whether a
distributor or underwriter is safe in publishing the customary analyses of outstanding security issues. We
have said before, and I repeat here that we have never raised any questions in this regard, so
long as the organization which is publishing such reports is not engaged at the same time in
the sale of unregistered securities” (SEC [1958], p. 8).
7 See Choi and Pritchard [2008, Chapter 7] for more details on the offering process and
regulation therein.
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Rule 168 clarifies the meaning of regularly released factual business com-
munication and forward-looking information, thereby reducing litigation
risk associated with the disclosure of both regularly released factual and
forward-looking information.8
In providing its rationale for the Reform, the SEC states that “[T]he pri-
mary benefit that the rules seek to achieve is an increased flow of infor-
mation to investors during a registered offering. While much of the Com-
mission’s recent rulemaking is intended to encourage reporting issuers to
provide materially accurate and complete information to the market on
a more current basis, the Securities Act’s constraints on communications
[i.e., gun jumping provisions] during an offering cause issuers to be con-
cerned about the treatment of their ongoing communications and whether
their customary disclosures will be considered an impermissible offer of se-
curities . . . ” (SEC [2005], p. 281). The SEC adds that increased information
flow promotes more efficient capital markets by allowing investors to more
accurately value securities while current liability and disclosure rules will
maintain investor protection around offerings.
Opponents of the Reform argue that the gun-jumping restrictions pro-
tect investors from managers conditioning the market before offerings,
and the relaxation of these restrictions will increase managerial incentives
to mislead the market. For example, Morrissey [2007, p. 576] suggests,
“Forward-looking statements do exactly what the SEC had historically not
wanted issuers to do before filing a registration statement: condition the
market to purchase the securities to be issued.” Further, in providing an ex
ante opinion regarding the then-proposed Reform, Lang and Lundholm
[2000, p. 648] offer that their evidence suggests that “firms may be tempted
to increase the use of forecasts before issuing equity absent the gun-
jumping regulations.”
2.2 PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Information asymmetry among investors creates trading frictions
by introducing adverse selection, leading to lower liquidity (Bagehot
[1971], Copeland and Galai [1983], Glosten and Milgrom [1985], Kyle
[1985], Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]). This illiquidity is priced by the mar-
ket, increasing a firm’s cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson [1986],
Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1996]). Analytical studies propose that dis-
closure can reduce information asymmetry, and lower the cost of capital.
Diamond [1985] shows that shareholder welfare can be improved when
firms disclose information, as the public disclosure reduces private infor-
mation acquisition costs by some investors, thereby reducing information
asymmetry among investors. As Diamond indicates [1985, p. 1073], “pub-
lic information makes traders’ beliefs more homogeneous and reduces the
magnitude of speculative positions which informed traders take.” Further,
8 We describe the relevant sections of the Reform in the appendix.
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Diamond and Verrecchia [1991] show that disclosure can lower a firm’s cost
of capital by reducing information asymmetry and improving the firm’s fu-
ture liquidity.9 Collectively, this indicates that a lack of disclosure (e.g., a
preoffering quiet period) can create incentives for some investors to pri-
vately acquire information, thereby increasing information asymmetry and
thus the cost of capital (e.g., issuing equity at discounted prices).10 By in-
creasing their disclosure, firms can combat these market frictions and re-
duce their cost of capital.
Despite the incentives to increase disclosure activity before SEOs, prior
to 2005, gun-jumping laws restricted firms’ disclosure activity. For example,
Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson [1995] find no evidence of an increase
in the likelihood of a forecast before equity offerings and suggest that
this behavior can be explained by litigation risk arising from gun-jumping
rules. Consistent with Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson [1995], Lang and
Lundholm [2000] find no evidence that firms increase their forecasting
frequency prior to equity offerings even though they find evidence that
firms increase the disclosure of factual information. If firms shied away
from disclosing information before equity offerings for fear of violating
gun-jumping rules, we should observe an increase in disclosure activity fol-
lowing the relaxation of these rules.
However, ex ante it is unclear whether firms will actually provide more
preoffering disclosure after the Reform. First, as the SEC indicates in the
Reform, disclosure regulation, such as Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD)
and SOX, significantly increased mandatory disclosure requirements. In
particular, material information must be disclosed when known. Thus, any
relevant information remaining to be disclosed before an offering could
be insignificant. Second, although the Reform relaxes gun-jumping rules,
there is still some ambiguity regarding what constitutes appropriate disclo-
sures and whether these disclosures can lead to gun-jumping violations,
especially for non-WKSIs.11 Moreover, antifraud laws (i.e., Rule 10b-5) con-
tinue to penalize disclosure violations. Given the high costs of violating
9 An alternative relation between disclosure and information asymmetry is proposed by Kim
and Verrecchia [1994], who indicate that public disclosures can increase information asym-
metry in the short term (i.e., less than two days), as investors with better processing abilities are
able to extract more information from disclosures than are less capable investors. However,
our analyses focus on information asymmetry over longer periods (i.e., >90 days).
10 To reduce the cost of raising capital, firms can make offerings in periods of low infor-
mation asymmetry, such as after earnings announcements (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald
[1991]). In additional analyses tabulated in the online appendix of this paper, we find that
the Reform does not lead to changes in the timing of SEOs relative to earnings releases (see
figure OA1 in the online appendix).
11 For example, non-WKSIs are allowed, under Rule 163A, to continue the regular release
of factual and forward-looking information, provided they do not refer to the equity offering less than
30 days before the registration statement is filed. However, if a firm’s management gives an interview
prior to the 30-day period, they will not be able to rely on the safe harbor if the interview is
published during the 30-day period. This has led many to take the view of the global law firm,
Latham & Watkins, LLP [2005, p. 8]: “In short, because situations like this are all too easy to
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both gun-jumping and antifraud rules, firms may refrain from increasing
disclosure even after the Reform. The above discussion leads to our first
hypothesis.
H1: Equity-offering firms increase their disclosure frequency immedi-
ately before their offering after the enactment of the 2005 Securi-
ties Offering Reform.
While there is some empirical support for the negative relation between
disclosure and information asymmetry with respect to a commitment to in-
creased disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]), it is less clear whether
voluntary disclosure can reduce information asymmetry, as managers can
be strategic when choosing their disclosures.12 For example, prior studies
argue and find evidence consistent with managers strategically using vol-
untary disclosure as a tool to influence the market’s expectation of firm
value. In particular, Barclay and Smith [1988] show that managers can alter
the normal flow of information to the market through spurring or delay-
ing the release of news. Brockman, Khurana, and Martin [2008] demon-
strate that managers increase bad news disclosure when they have incentive
to dampen a stock price prior to open market repurchases, and increase
good news disclosure after their open market repurchases. These studies
show that voluntary disclosures can be opportunistic, and thus not credi-
ble. Therefore, whether or not voluntary disclosures before SEOs lead to a
decrease in information asymmetry is an empirical question.
H2a: Equity-offering firms’ pre-SEO voluntary disclosure behavior fol-
lowing the Reform is associated with market conditioning.
H2b: Equity-offering firms’ pre-SEO voluntary disclosure behavior fol-
lowing the Reform is associated with a reduction in pre-SEO infor-
mation asymmetry.
3. Research Design
3.1 EMPIRICAL METHOD
To test our hypotheses, we compare the disclosure behavior of SEO firms
in the three months before an SEO to (1) the SEO firms’ disclosure behav-
ior in the neighboring periods, and (2) the disclosure behavior of matched
non-SEO control firms over the same periods. In addition, we employ a
envision, we believe practice with respect to pre-filing publicity will not change significantly as
a result of Rule 163A, and we do not expect to change our advice to non-WKSI issuers to be
cautious in their public communications prior to the filing of a registration statement.”
12 Leuz and Verrecchia [2000, p. 94] point out that, “[T]he distinction between a commit-
ment and a voluntary disclosure is that the former is a decision by the firm about what it will
disclose before it knows the content of the information (i.e., ex ante), whereas the latter is a
decision by the firm made after it observes the content (i.e., ex post) . . . only a commitment
requires that information be disclosed regardless of its content . . . ”
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difference-in-differences design that examines changes in disclosure behav-
ior of SEO firms following the Reform relative to that for matched firms
and neighboring disclosure windows. Our research design enables us to
isolate the effect of the Reform on the disclosure behavior of SEO firms by
controlling for (1) the possibility that the disclosures of an SEO firm are
systematically different from those of a firm not issuing equity, and (2) po-
tential time period effects in firms’ disclosure behavior before SEOs that
affect both SEO and non-SEO firms.
We use propensity score matching to identify a sample of non-SEO firms
similar to the SEO firms in terms of their likelihood of issuing equity. We
match on the following variables, as measured at the beginning of the
SEO filing quarter: (1) market value of equity, (2) Tobin’s Q, (3) return
on assets, (4) sales growth, (5) cash holdings, (6) firm age, (7) common
stock dividends paid, and (8) cumulative abnormal returns in the prior fis-
cal quarter. Tobin’s Q, return on assets, and sales growth are proxies for
growth opportunities. Firm size (i.e., the market value of equity), firm age,
cash holdings, and dividends paid are proxies for financing constraints. We
match on growth opportunities and financing constraints to capture differ-
ences in firms’ need for, and ability to raise, equity financing. Specifically,
we match firms on growth opportunities because high-growth firms require
more external financing and are likely to access equity markets more fre-
quently (Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson [1995], Jo and Kim [2007]). How-
ever, to the extent that a firm is financially constrained, it is less likely to
be able to raise equity financing in a cost-effective manner. We also match
firms on past returns to allow for the possibility that firms time the equity
market when the cost of capital is low or their equity is overvalued (Baker
and Wurgler [2002]).
Our matching procedure relies on a nearest neighbor matching of
propensity scores (see Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983], Wooldridge [2002]).
In particular, we employ a logistic regression at the firm-quarter level, where
we regress a binary variable indicating whether or not a particular firm is-
sues equity on the above firm characteristics. The logistic regression is es-
timated on the entire Compustat population with data from 2003 to 2008
and provides us with a firm’s propensity to issue equity in each quarter. For
each SEO firm in our sample, we identify a non-SEO firm with the clos-
est propensity score that is not issuing equity, but operating in the same
industry and year. Our matching procedure results in no significant differ-
ence between our SEO firm and non-SEO firm samples with respect to the
matched variables (see section 4).13
13 An important limitation of the matching procedure is that it controls only for selection
on observables. Thus, unobservable differences among the SEO firms and non-SEO firms can
compromise our identification strategy if those unobservable differences are correlated with
disclosure incentives. However, in our setting, any unobservable differences not only have to
be correlated with disclosure incentives, but also with the enactment of the Reform to affect
our inferences.
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We choose the research design described above, recognizing the endo-
geneity in firms’ disclosure choices and their equity offering choice. In
particular, a firm’s decision to issue equity and the change in its disclo-
sure behavior could be driven by a third factor, a positive net present
value project that becomes available to the firm (or some similar news
that the manager is privy to). We address this issue by comparing the dis-
closure behavior of SEO firms to observably similar non-SEO firms using
the Reform as a quasi-exogenous shock to SEO firms’ disclosure incen-
tives. Any change in the disclosure behavior of SEO firms relative to non-
SEO firms indicates that the Reform at least partly affects firms’ disclosure
behavior.
3.2 EMPIRICAL PROXIES AND DISCUSSION
3.2.1. Disclosure Frequency. We examine two types of voluntary disclo-
sure—management forecasts and firm-initiated press releases (excluding
forecasts)—intended to proxy for forward-looking and factual business in-
formation, respectively, because the Reform relaxed restrictions on these
disclosures.14 We examine management forecasts and press releases sepa-
rately because gun-jumping rules are stricter for the disclosure of forward-
looking information. However, our inferences are unchanged if we do not
distinguish between these disclosure forms and simply examine voluntary
disclosure frequency. We assume changes in firms’ disclosures related to
forthcoming offerings happen in the three months prior to the SEO filing
date. Following Rogers and Van Buskirk [2009], we measure Forecast Fre-
quency (Press Release Frequency) as the annualized number of management
forecasts (press releases) in the three-month window before an SEO, that
is, pre-SEO window, and in the 365-day intervals around the pre-SEO win-
dow, that is, neighboring windows (see figure 1). We assume that Forecast
Frequency (Press Release Frequency) is zero if a firm is covered in the database
but does not issue a forecast (press release) in the pre-SEO window or the
neighboring windows.
We also examine whether firms provide more “good news” disclosures
in the pre-SEO window following the Reform using two measures of good
news disclosure. Our first measure is the Proportion of GN, which captures
the number of good news disclosures relative to the number of bad news
disclosures in the pre-SEO period. A disclosure is considered to provide
good (bad) news if it induces a positive (negative) cumulative abnormal
return in the three-day window [–1, 1] around the disclosure date, where
14 Although press releases can contain nonfactual information, such as qualitative infor-
mation about the firms’ products, marketing campaigns, subjective interpretations of quar-
terly/annual earnings releases, etc., we believe our classification is appropriate because these
disclosures fall within the scope of “factual business information,” as described in the Reform
(see SEC [2005], p. 56). Further, obtaining a more refined proxy for factual information by
identifying purely factual press releases poses a considerable empirical challenge.
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Filing/Announcement date
Issuance date
365 days 90 days 365 days
SEO=0     SEO =1                                  SEO=0        
FIG. 1.—Timeline of disclosure announcements and SEO filings for tables 3, 4, and 6. SEO
= 1/0 for both SEO firms and match firms for the 90-day pre-SEO window/the two 365-day
neighboring windows.
abnormal return is the firm’s return minus the return of the CRSP value-
weighted index. The second measure of good news disclosure is the Sum
of SRET, which is the aggregate cumulative abnormal returns for the three-
day window [–1, 1] around firms’ disclosures during the pre-SEO period.
Therefore, the Proportion of GN captures the relative frequency of good news
issued by managers, and the Sum of SRET captures the aggregate magnitude
of news in firms’ disclosures. When a firm provides no forecasts or issues
no press releases in a disclosure window (i.e., the pre-SEO window or the
neighboring window), we set the variable as zero.
Our focus on the short window return around the disclosure announce-
ments provides us several benefits. First, it directly captures investors’ reac-
tion to the disclosures as opposed to subjectively determining the optimism
or pessimism in the disclosures (Lang and Lundholm [2000]). Second, our
measure captures the impact of qualitative information as well as various
types of forecasts, including point forecasts, range forecasts, and qualitative
forecasts conveyed during the disclosure announcements. Third, the disclo-
sure announcement return also captures forecast biases linked to potential
reversals in the future when testing for evidence of market conditioning,
while avoiding issues related to calculating forecast errors from observed
earnings realizations.15
15 An alternative approach to capture hyping is to examine forecast bias using realized earn-
ings. However, observed forecast bias (i.e., earnings forecast minus realized earnings) is a func-
tion of two variables that are at least somewhat under managers’ control. That is, managers
can bias forecasts, then manage to that earnings number, so that the empirically observed
forecast error is zero. Prior research finds that firms manage earnings both before and after
an SEO (Rangan [1998], Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1998], Shivakumar [2000], Cohen and
Zarowin [2010]). Further, prior research provides strong evidence that managers deliberately
try to meet or beat their earnings forecast by managing earnings (Kasznik [1999]). Graham,
Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005] find that “CFOs dislike the prospect of coming up short on
their numbers, particularly if they are guided numbers . . . ” (p. 42). Such incentives to meet
management-issued earnings forecasts are likely to be even stronger immediately before an
SEO, as there is increased litigation risk. Therefore, examining forecast bias to infer manage-
rial hyping is problematic.
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Filing/Announcement date    
Issuance date 
90-day disclosure window         
Abnormal return window (18 months)
FIG. 2.—Timeline of disclosure announcements, SEO issuances, and subsequent abnormal
returns for table 5.
3.2.2. Market Conditioning. To identify market conditioning, we check
for (1) any changes in the propensity to issue good news relative to bad
news and/or changes in the magnitude of good news conveyed to the mar-
ket before an SEO following the enactment of the 2005 Reform, and (2)
any reversal in the stock price after the SEO that is associated with the
pre-SEO disclosures, as the effect of managerial hyping unravels. We mea-
sure abnormal returns (AR) as market-adjusted returns, where we calculate
the market return as the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index
(Rangan [1998], Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1998], Jo and Kim [2007]). Fol-
lowing Lang and Lundholm [2000], returns are compounded over the 18
months following the SEO issuance date (see figure 2). To capture the ex-
tent to which managers engage in hyping behavior before the SEO, we link
subsequent returns (AR) with the relative frequency of good news disclosed
and the aggregate news disclosed in the pre-SEO window (i.e., Proportion of
GN and Sum of SRET).16
3.2.3. Information Asymmetry. We use three proxies for information asym-
metry. Our first proxy is the adverse selection component of the aver-
age daily bid-ask spread (ASC Spread). ASC Spread measures the extent to
which unexpected order flow affects prices and is increasing in information
asymmetry (Brennan and Subrahmanyam [1996], Armstrong et al. [2011],
Akins, Ng, and Verdi [2012]). We measure ASC Spread using the procedure
described in the appendix of Armstrong et al. [2011].
Our second proxy for information asymmetry is the average daily depth
(Market Depth), or order size, because liquidity suppliers can address adverse
selection concerns by adjusting spread and/or the number of shares they
16 In additional analyses tabulated in table OA2 in the online appendix, we also verify the
robustness of our inferences to using (1) the Sum of SRET conditional on the cumulative ab-
normal return being positive, (2) decile ranks of the Sum of SRET, and (3) the total frequency
of good news disclosures (rather than the proportion of good news disclosures). These al-
ternative proxies allow the relation between pre-SEO good news disclosures and post-SEO
abnormal returns to be nonlinear.
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are willing to trade (Lee, Mucklow, and Ready [1993], Leuz and Wysocki
[2008]). Market Depth is calculated as the average sum of the dollar of-
fer size and the dollar bid size of each quote. We obtain trade-by-trade
and quote data from the TAQ database to compute ASC Spread and Market
Depth.
Our third proxy for information asymmetry is the average analyst earn-
ings forecast accuracy (Analyst Forecast Accuracy). An analyst’s ability to fore-
cast a firm’s earnings is a function of the firm’s information environment.
Firms that are more transparent about their operations and their disclo-
sures have less information asymmetry between analysts and managers (and
among analysts), leading to more accurate earnings forecasts by the aver-
age analyst (Barron et al. [1998], Hope [2003]). Analyst Forecast Accuracy is
computed as minus one times the absolute value of analyst consensus earn-
ings per share (EPS) forecast minus the actual EPS divided by the absolute
value actual EPS.
4. Data, Sample Selection, and Summary Statistics
We obtain management forecast announcements from First Call,
firm-initiated press releases from RavenPack, SEO data from Security
Data Company (SDC) Platinum, financial information from Compustat,
stock returns from CRSP, analyst EPS forecasts and actual EPS data
from I/B/E/S, and daily trade-by-trade and quote data from TAQ. Our
sample period begins in 2003 to avoid confounding effects of Reg FD
and SOX on firms’ disclosure behavior. We end our sample period in
2008, because we require 18 months of stock returns data following
SEOs.
We begin our sample construction by identifying the SEOs in SDC with
nonmissing filing dates and issuance dates that are no more than 90 days
apart. We require SEO firms to have financial data on Compustat and stock
returns data on CRSP for the three-month period prior to the SEO fil-
ing month. This procedure leaves us with 839 SEO events over the period
2003–2008. We drop 47 SEO events for which we are unable to obtain a
matched firm, leaving us with 792 SEO events and 792 matched non-SEO
firms.
To test our predictions, we compare the disclosure behavior of our sam-
ple firms—both SEO and matched firms—in the pre-SEO window to their
disclosure behavior in the two neighboring windows (see figure 1). There-
fore, our unit of analysis is a “disclosure window” centered on the pre-SEO
window. We require each observation to have CRSP and Compustat data for
at least one of the two neighboring windows around the pre-SEO window.
This procedure leaves us with a final sample of 4,651 disclosure window
observations.
We merge the 4,651 observations with First Call and RavenPack to obtain
data on the frequency of management forecasts and press releases in each
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disclosure window.17,18 Following Cheng and Lo [2006] and Brockman,
Khurana, and Martin [2008], we include all forecast announcements,
regardless of whether it is an earnings forecast or a forecast of other
summary measures, such as cash flows or revenue, and regardless of
whether the forecasts are for a quarterly or annual period. We treat mul-
tiple forecasts made by the same firm on the same day as a single forecast
event. For example, earnings forecasts for the following quarter and the
following year are treated as a single forecast event. Similarly, we include all
(nonforecast) press releases initiated by a firm regardless of the content of
the news. We also treat multiple press releases issued by the same firm on
the same day as a single press release.
To test for reversals in stock prices after SEOs, we start with the sample
of firms used in our disclosure analyses. We find that 48 SEO firms and 76
control firms are missing 18 months of consecutive stock returns following
the SEO. We obtain delisting returns for 28 SEO firms and 46 control firms
and drop the remaining 50 SEO events (i.e., 48 + 76 – 28 – 46) because of
missing returns data for either the SEO firm or the matched control firm.
Therefore, our analysis of abnormal stock returns following SEOs is based
on 1,484 observations (i.e., 742 SEO firms + 742 matched firms). Table 1
outlines our sample selection process.
Table 2, panel A, provides the descriptive statistics for the matching cri-
teria. As shown, there is no significant difference in the mean values of any
of the matching variables for our SEO sample and the matched control
sample. Further, table 2, panel B, shows that the differences in the mean
values of the matching variables for our SEO sample and the matched con-
trol sample continue to be insignificant when we split the sample into SEOs
during the pre-Reform and post-Reform periods. These results indicate that
our matching procedure is effective.
Table 2, panel C, presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in
our analyses. Our SEO firms, on average, make 1.43 forecasts and initiate
17 Chuk, Matsumoto, and Miller [2013] find that First Call’s CIG forecast sample is different
from a hand-collected random sample of Compustat firms in terms of coverage and forecast
announcement timing and that these differences are systematically related to analyst follow-
ing and institutional ownership. We note that our research design makes it unlikely that these
database limitations affect our inferences. Specifically, our research design compares the fore-
casting behavior of SEO firms in the pre-SEO period after the Reform to (1) their forecasting
behavior in the neighboring periods, (2) the forecasting behavior of matched control firms
over the same periods, and (3) the forecasting behavior of both SEO and control firms before
the Reform. Therefore, any database biases would have to survive a “triple difference” to affect
our inferences.
18 RavenPack obtains press coverage data from a number of sources, including Dow Jones
Newswires, all editions of the Wall Street Journal, and Barrons. To validate the use of RavenPack
in our study, we examine the overlap in monthly press release frequency between RavenPack
and Factiva (an extensive press release database commonly used by researchers) for a random
sample of 50 firms and find that the correlation in press release frequency is 94.7%. This
high correlation is perhaps not surprising given that RavenPack partners with Dow Jones (the
creator of Factiva) to obtain press coverage data.
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TA B L E 1
Sample Selection
Observations Number of
No. SEO Event Sample: 2003–2008 Dropped Observations
1. SEO events from 2003–2008 in the
intersection of CRSP & Compustat
839
2. Less: SEO events missing a firm that meets the
matching criteria
47 792
3. SEO events used in the disclosure frequency
analyses
792
4. SEO events plus matched non-SEO firms
(No. 3 × 2)
Table 9 1,584
5. Each SEO firm and its match has a 90-day
pre-SEO window along with one or two
neighboring windows. We require both
SEO firms and the matched firms to have
at least one neighboring window with
nonmissing data.
Tables 3, 4, 6,
7, 8
4,651
SEO Events for Return Reversal Analysis: Observations Number of
2003–2008 Dropped Observations
6. SEO events used in the disclosure frequency
analyses
792
7. Less: SEO events missing 18 months of
consecutive returns subsequent to issuance
20 772
8. Less: Matched firms missing 18 months of
consecutive returns subsequent to issuance
30 742
9. SEO events plus matched non-SEO firms
(No. 8 × 2)
Table 5 1,484
15.8 press releases annually. However, we find that the average SEO firm
provides 3.6 forecasts if we restrict the sample to include only firms that is-
sued at least one forecast in our sample period, which is no different from
that for the entire population of firms in the First Call database.19 The
matched firms provide marginally more forecasts and fewer press releases.
Table 2 also shows that SEO firms tend to have marginally higher infor-
mation asymmetry than the matched firm sample. Finally, we find that the
market reactions around these disclosures tend to be more positive for SEO
firms than for matched firms, indicating that the SEO firms provide more
good news disclosures.
5. Empirical Analyses and Results
We first examine whether the 2005 Reform affects the frequency of pre-
SEO disclosures. We then examine whether the change in pre-SEO disclo-
sure frequency is associated with market conditioning or a reduction in
information asymmetry. Next, we examine the differential impact of the
19 We find very similar results if we restrict our sample to those firms that issue at least one
forecast/press release in the pre-SEO window.
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TA B L E 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Matching Criteria
Matching Variables SEO Firm Sample Matched Firm Sample Difference t-Statistic
Full Sample
Propensity score 0.013 0.013 0.000 1.40
LSIZE 6.561 6.537 0.024 0.42
ROA 0.001 0.004 −0.004 −1.27
TOBIN’s Q 2.550 2.376 0.174 1.48
SALES GROWTH 0.153 0.146 0.007 0.19
ABRET 0.142 0.127 0.015 1.44
CASH HOLDING 0.190 0.176 0.015 1.60
AGE 10.540 11.216 −0.676 −1.50
DIVIDEND 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.91
N 792 792
Panel B: Matching Criteria in the Pre- and Post-Reform Periods
Matching Variables SEO Firm Sample Matched Firm Sample Difference t-Statistic
Pre-Reform Sample
Propensity score 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.58
LSIZE 6.336 6.383 −0.048 −0.63
ROA −0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.44
TOBIN’s Q 2.338 2.201 0.137 1.53
SALES GROWTH 0.142 0.140 0.001 0.03
ABRET 0.181 0.168 0.013 0.83
CASH HOLDING 0.184 0.173 0.011 0.99
AGE 10.357 10.771 −0.414 −0.73
DIVIDEND 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.02
N 454 454
Post-Reform Sample
Propensity score 0.014 0.013 0.001 1.42
LSIZE 6.863 6.743 0.121 1.36
ROA 0.002 0.008 −0.006 −1.35
TOBIN’s Q 2.834 2.610 0.224 0.90
SALES GROWTH 0.168 0.155 0.013 0.23
ABRET 0.089 0.071 0.018 1.45
CASH HOLDING 0.199 0.179 0.019 1.29
AGE 10.785 11.811 −1.027 −1.40
DIVIDEND 0.015 0.013 0.002 1.21
N 338 338
Panel C: Sample Used in Pre-SEO Disclosure Frequency Analyses
Variables Mean SD P25 Median P75 N
SEO Firm Sample
Forecast Frequency 1.429 2.089 0.000 0.000 3.000 2,333
Press Release Frequency 15.801 14.212 5.000 13.000 23.000 2,333
Proportion of GN—Forecast 1.384 1.297 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,333
Sum of SRET—Forecast 0.005 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 2,333
Proportion of GN—Press Release 1.563 1.818 0.846 1.000 1.556 2,333
Sum of SRET—Press Release 0.059 0.215 −0.011 0.018 0.143 2,333
ASC Spread (%) 4.707 4.302 1.983 3.293 5.600 2,333
Market Depth 206.1 145.9 102.5 167.2 267.4 2,333
Analyst Forecast Accuracy −0.351 0.585 −0.393 −0.177 −0.087 1,956
SEO Announcement Return −0.042 0.462 −0.336 −0.055 0.236 742
(Continued)
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TA B L E 2—Continued
Panel C: Sample Used in Pre-SEO Disclosure Frequency Analyses
Variables Mean SD P25 Median P75 N
MTB 5.012 5.463 1.888 2.981 5.798 2,333
ANALYST FOLLOWING 5.145 4.232 2.000 4.000 7.000 2,333
LSIZE 6.564 1.267 5.766 6.435 7.336 2,333
ROA −0.001 0.050 −0.001 0.009 0.020 2,333
LNOWN 1.030 1.196 0.112 0.472 1.705 2,333
INST HOLDING 0.554 0.291 0.317 0.557 0.812 2,333
LNPRC 3.052 0.717 2.682 3.135 3.519 2,333
Matched Firm Sample
Forecast Frequency 1.746 2.461 0.000 0.000 4.000 2,318
Press Release Frequency 16.874 15.645 6.000 14.000 24.000 2,318
Proportion of GN—Forecast 1.196 0.991 1.000 1.000 1.000 2,318
Sum of SRET—Forecast −0.004 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 2,318
Proportion of GN—Press Release 1.365 1.536 0.765 1.000 1.333 2,318
Sum of SRET—Press Release 0.025 0.216 −0.048 0.000 0.106 2,318
ASC Spread (%) 3.981 4.972 1.342 2.150 4.166 2,318
Market Depth 238.1 156.4 112.8 202.5 335.0 2,318
Analyst Forecast Accuracy −0.325 0.548 −0.364 −0.150 −0.068 1,785
SEO Announcement Return 0.061 0.584 −0.282 −0.021 0.231 742
MTB 3.711 4.330 1.547 2.390 4.134 2,318
ANALYST FOLLOWING 6.548 6.602 1.000 4.667 9.500 2,318
LSIZE 6.929 1.746 5.784 6.917 7.970 2,318
ROA 0.003 0.045 −0.001 0.010 0.023 2,318
LNOWN 1.438 1.436 0.249 0.984 2.219 2,318
INST HOLDING 0.609 0.307 0.384 0.691 0.856 2,318
LNPRC 3.047 0.930 2.586 3.212 3.634 2,318
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our matching procedure and analy-
ses. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity measured at the fiscal quarter-end immediately
preceding the SEO filing date. ROA is return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items
scaled by total assets at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. TOBIN’s Q is the
market value of a firm’s equity plus the book value of debt, scaled by the book value of assets at the fiscal
quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. SALES GROWTH is the change in quarterly sales,
scaled by lag sales at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. ABRET is cumulative
abnormal returns in the fiscal quarter immediately preceding the SEO filing date, where abnormal return
is the firm’s return minus the return of the CRSP value-weighted index. CASH HOLDING is cash balance of
the firm, scaled by assets measured at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. AGE
is the difference between the current fiscal year and the first year the firm appears on the CRSP database.
DIVIDEND is cash dividends paid, scaled by total assets in the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the
SEO filing date. Forecast Frequency (Press Release Frequency) is the annualized number of management forecasts
(press releases) in the 90-day window before an SEO (i.e., pre-SEO window), and in the 365-day intervals
around the pre-SEO window (i.e., neighboring windows). If there is no disclosure in the window, then the
value is set to zero. Proportion of GN—Forecast (Press Release) is the annualized number of good news forecasts
(press releases) relative to bad news forecasts (press releases) in the pre-SEO window and in the neighbor-
ing windows, where a disclosure is considered to provide good (bad) news if it induces a positive (negative)
cumulative abnormal return in the three-day window [–1, 1] around the disclosure date. If there is no dis-
closure in the window, then the value is set to zero. We add one to the numerator and denominator to avoid
a zero denominator problem in case firms do not disclose any bad news in a given disclosure window. Sum of
SRET—Forecast (Press Release) is the aggregate cumulative abnormal returns in the three-day window [–1, 1]
around forecast announcements (press releases) in the pre-SEO window, and in the neighboring windows.
If there is no disclosure in the window, then the value is set to zero. ASC Spread is the adverse selection
component of daily bid-ask spread following the approach in Armstrong et al. [2011]. Market Depth is the
average sum of each quote’s dollar offer size and the dollar bid size. Analyst Forecast Accuracy is negative
one multiplied by the absolute value of analyst consensus earnings forecast minus actual earnings, scaled
by actual earnings. SEO Announcement Return is the three-day cumulative market-adjusted return around
the SEO announcement date. MTB is market-to-book ratio of equity measured at the fiscal quarter-end
immediately preceding the SEO filing date. ANALYST FOLLOWING is the number of analysts in the fiscal
quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. LNOWN is the natural logarithm of one plus the
number of shareholders at the fiscal year-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. INST HOLDING
is the percentage of the firms’ shares owned by institutional investors at the calendar quarter-end immedi-
ately preceding the SEO filing date. LNPRC is the natural logarithm of stock price at the fiscal quarter-end
immediately preceding the SEO filing date.
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Panel A: Forecasting Frequency Before and After the Reform
Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period
Panel B: Press-Release Frequency Before and After the Reform
Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period
FIG. 3.—Disclosure frequency of SEO and control firms in the pre- and post-Reform periods.
Panel A (B) presents the frequency of forecasts (press releases) provided by SEO firms and
a propensity score-matched control sample of non-SEO firms. The disclosure frequencies are
examined in the pre-SEO window (i.e., the 90-day period before SEO filing) and in the two
neighboring windows. Figure 1 provides a graphical description of the SEO window and the
neighboring windows.
Reform on WKSIs and non-WKSIs. Finally, we examine the impact of the
Reform on the cost of raising capital.
5.1. THE EFFECT OF THE 2005 REFORM ON FIRMS’ DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOR
We begin by examining whether the Reform leads to a change in pre-
SEO disclosure frequency. Figure 3 provides graphical evidence of changes
in disclosure frequency of SEO firms and matched firms in the pre-SEO
window and the neighboring windows. Specifically, figure 3 shows that SEO
firms significantly reduce the number of forecasts and press releases issued
in the pre-SEO window before the Reform (relative to neighboring periods
and the control sample). However, after the Reform, we observe no such
reduction in their disclosure frequency in the pre-SEO window. Rather,
SEO firms appear to shift disclosures from the neighboring window to the
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pre-SEO window after the Reform. Next, we estimate the following
difference-in-differences regression to test our prediction in a multivariate
setting:
Frequencyit = β1 + β2SEOFIRMi + β3SEOit + β4POSTREFORMt
+β5SEOFIRMi × SEOit + β6SEOFIRMi × POSTREFORMt
+β7SEOit × POSTREFORMt + β8SEOFIRMi × SEOit
×POSTREFORMt +
∑
γControls + εit ,
(1)
where Frequency is either Forecast Frequency or Press Release Frequency; SEOFIRM
is an indicator variable that equals one for firms in the SEO sample and zero
for firms in the matched sample. SEO is an indicator variable that equals
one for the 90-day pre-SEO period for both the SEO firm and its matched
control firm, and it equals zero for the two neighboring windows (see
figure 1). POSTREFORM is an indicator variable that equals one if the SEO
filing date is after 2005 and zero otherwise. Controls is a vector of firm char-
acteristics likely associated with a firm’s information environment and dis-
closure behavior.
Our choice of control variables follows prior literature (e.g., Lang
and Lundholm [2000], Jo and Kim [2007], Brockman, Khurana, and
Martin [2008]). We control for the natural logarithm of the market value
of equity (LSIZE), market-to-book ratio of equity (MTB), return on assets
(ROA), the number of analysts following the firm (ANALYST FOLLOWING),
and the percentage of the firms’ shares owned by institutional investors
(INST HOLDING). LSIZE, MTB, ROA, and ANALYST FOLLOWING are mea-
sured at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the disclosure date.
INST HOLDING is measured using the most recent data prior to the dis-
closure announcement. Following Bushee et al. [2010], we also control for
differences in firm-specific demand for voluntary disclosure by including
the log of one plus the fiscal year-end number of shareholders (LNOWN)
and the log of quarter-end stock price (LNPRC). We include indicator vari-
ables for each year and each of the 48 industries in Fama and French [1997]
to control for unobserved year and industry attributes that affect firms’ dis-
closure choices. The coefficients of interest in equation (1) are β5 and β8,
where β5 captures the pre-SEO disclosure frequency before the Reform,
and β8 captures the change in pre-SEO disclosure frequency following the
Reform incremental to the change in the disclosure frequency of matched
non-SEO firms.
Table 3 presents the results from estimating equation (1). Consistent with
Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson [1995] and Lang and Lundholm [2000],
we find no evidence of a disproportionate increase in forecast frequency
in the pre-SEO period relative to neighboring periods and a matched set
of control firms prior to the Reform. In fact, the coefficient for SEO ×
SEOFIRM (β5) is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level (or
better), indicating that SEO firms significantly decrease the number of dis-
closures made just before an SEO. This decline in voluntary disclosures in
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TA B L E 3
Disclosure Frequency Before SEOs
Dependent Variable: Forecast Frequency Press Release Frequency
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
SEO −0.111 −1.36 −0.388 −0.85
SEOFIRM 0.014 0.12 0.096 0.14
SEOFIRM × SEO −0.344∗∗∗ −2.99 −1.553∗∗ −2.46
SEOFIRM × SEO × POSTREFORM 0.513∗∗∗ 2.92 2.707∗∗ 2.28
SEO × POSTREFORM 0.027 0.21 −0.742 −0.90
SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM −0.118 −0.62 1.083 0.93
POSTREFORM 1.077 1.59 −0.430 −0.16
MTB −0.026∗∗ −2.52 −0.028 −0.44
ANALYST FOLLOWING 0.028∗∗ 2.03 0.409∗∗∗ 3.52
LSIZE 0.214∗∗∗ 3.43 2.408∗∗∗ 4.36
ROA 4.332∗∗∗ 4.56 −15.261∗∗ −2.36
LNOWN 0.062 1.28 0.200 0.57
INST HOLDING 1.116∗∗∗ 5.35 3.634∗∗ 2.45
LNPRC −0.037 −0.42 −0.321 −0.52
Year Indicators Included Included
Industry Indicators Included Included
R 2 23.4% 22.6%
No. of observations 4,651 4,651
This table presents the results from estimating equation (1). Forecast Frequency (Press Release Frequency) is
the annualized number of management forecasts (press releases) in the 90-day window before an SEO and
in the 365-day intervals around the pre-SEO window (see figure 1). SEO is an indicator variable that equals
one for disclosures made in the pre-SEO window, and zero otherwise. SEOFIRM is an indicator variable that
equals one for the SEO firm sample, and zero for the matched firm sample. POSTREFORM is an indicator
variable that equals one if the SEO filing date is after 2005, and zero otherwise. MTB is the market-to-book
ratio of equity measured at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. ANALYST
FOLLOWING is the number of analysts in the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date.
LSIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity measured at the fiscal quarter-end immediately
preceding the SEO filing date. ROA is return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items
scaled by total assets at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. LNOWN is the
natural logarithm of one plus the number of shareholders at the fiscal year-end immediately preceding the
SEO filing date. INST HOLDING is the percentage of the firms’ shares owned by institutional investors at
the calendar quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. LNPRC is the natural logarithm of
stock price at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. Year Indicators are indicator
variables for all but one of the years in our sample. Industry Indicators are indicator variables for all but one
of the 48 industries in Fama and French [1997]. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
the pre-SEO period is consistent with the firms changing their disclosure
behavior to avoid violating gun-jumping rules.
After the Reform, SEO firms increase both their forecasting frequency
and press release frequency in the pre-SEO window relative to neighboring
windows and the matched control firms. Table 3 shows that the coefficient
for SEO × SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM (β8) is positive and significant at the
5% level for both forecast frequency and press release frequency, suggest-
ing that relaxing gun-jumping rules induces firms to increase their pre-SEO
disclosures. The coefficients indicate that, following the Reform, SEO firms
provide 0.51 additional pre-SEO forecasts than they did before the Reform,
on average. This represents approximately a 36% increase in pre-SEO fore-
casts. Similarly, the coefficient for press releases indicates that SEO firms
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issue 2.71 (17%) more press releases in the pre-SEO period following the
Reform.
Finally, in untabulated F-tests we find that, following the Reform, the fore-
cast frequency and press release frequency of SEO firms in the pre-SEO
window are no different from those in the neighboring windows (p-value =
0.38 and 0.37).20 Collectively, these results indicate that the Reform led to
an economically and statistically significant increase in voluntary disclosure
frequency before SEOs, consistent with the SEC’s intent to encourage firms
to increase disclosure before equity offerings.
The coefficients for the control variables in table 3 are generally con-
sistent with expectations. Specifically, larger firms, firms with higher an-
alyst following, and firm with higher institutional ownership tend to dis-
close more (Lang and Lundholm [1996]). Further, consistent with Miller
[2002], firms with better past performance (i.e., ROA) tend to issue more
forecasts.
5.2 THE EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON MARKET CONDITIONING
Our hypothesis is that firms increase their pre-SEO disclosure to either
hype the stock or to reduce information asymmetry before the SEO. If
firms use pre-SEO disclosures to hype their stock price, we should observe
more good news in the pre-SEO period. Further, the pre-SEO disclosure
should be negatively associated with post-SEO abnormal returns as the mar-
ket learns of the mispricing. To examine if SEO firms increase good news
disclosure in the pre-SEO period after the Reform, we estimate the follow-
ing regression to test our prediction:
GN Disclosureit = β1 + β2SEOFIRMi + β3SEOit + β4POSTREFORMt
+β5SEOFIRMi × SEOit + β6SEOFIRMi × POSTREFORMt
+β7SEOit × POSTREFORMt + β8SEOFIRMi × SEOit
×POSTREFORMt +
∑
γControls + εit ,
(2)
where GN Disclosure is either the relative frequency of good news disclo-
sures (Proportion of GN) or the aggregate magnitude of news in firms’ dis-
closures (Sum of SRET).21 All other variables are as defined previously. The
coefficients of interest are β5 and β8, where β5 captures the pre-SEO good
news frequency (or aggregate news) before the Reform, and β8 captures
the change in pre-SEO good news frequency (or aggregate news) following
the Reform incremental to that observed in the neighboring periods and
that for matched non-SEO firms.
20 This inference is based on the results from an F-test, where the null hypothesis is that the
sum of the coefficients for SEO × SEOFIRM and SEO × SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM is zero.
21 In additional analyses tabulated in table OA6 in the online appendix, we find that our
inferences are unchanged when we use the frequency of good news disclosures relative to total
news, or just the frequency of good news disclosures.
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Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation (2). We find that
the coefficient estimate for β5 is statistically insignificant for both forms of
disclosure, that is, forecasts and press releases, and both measures of good
news, that is, Proportion of GN and Sum of SRET. Thus, we find no evidence
that SEO firms disproportionately increase the amount of good news in
the pre-SEO period before the enactment of the Reform. However, table
4 shows that the coefficient estimate for β8 is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level (or better) for both forms of disclosure and both
measures of good news. These results indicate that, following the Reform,
SEO firms provide more price-increasing disclosures (i.e., good news) in the
pre-SEO period relative to neighboring periods and a matched set of con-
trol firms.
Next, we examine whether the pre-SEO disclosures are associated with
an unwarranted increase in the firm’s stock price, as evidenced by post-
SEO stock market underperformance. In particular, we examine the as-
sociation between pre-SEO good news disclosures and post-SEO abnor-
mal returns using the following regression to test the managerial hyping
hypothesis:
ARit = β1 + β2SEOFIRMi + β3DISCit + β4POSTREFORMt + β5SEOFIRMi
×DISCit + β6SEOFIRMi × POSTREFORMt + β7DISCit
×POSTREFORMt + β8SEOFIRMi × DISCit × POSTREFORMt
+ ∑ θControls + εit ,
(3)
where AR is abnormal returns in the 18 months following an SEO and
DISC is either the Proportion of GN or the Sum of SRET.22 Given that our
regressions include interaction terms of continuous variables (i.e., DISC),
we demean DISC to ease the interpretation of interaction terms. All other
variables are as defined previously, except Controls, which is a vector of con-
trol variables that are likely to be associated with a firm’s future stock per-
formance. Our control variables include the cumulative abnormal return
in the three months before the SEO filing date (QABRET), natural log
of market value of equity (LSIZE), market-to-book ratio of equity (MTB),
return on assets (ROA), the number of forecast announcements or press
releases in the pre-SEO window (FREQ), and performance-adjusted dis-
cretionary accrual (PDA).23 LSIZE, MTB, ROA, and PDA are measured at
22 To the extent that our proxy for abnormal returns completely eliminates any systematic
component of stock returns that is expected given the level of risk, there is no benefit to in-
cluding a control sample. Although we tabulate the results using the benchmark sample as a
control group, we note that none of our inferences are affected if we reestimate our regres-
sions without the control sample (see table OA3 in the online appendix for these results).
23 To estimate the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, we first estimate discre-
tionary accruals using the modified Jones model. We use all the available observations in
Compustat to run this model by each quarter and two-digit SIC code that have at least five
observations. We use the residuals, εit, from these regressions as the proxy for discretionary
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TA B L E 4
Good News Disclosures Before SEOs
Panel A: Analysis of Management Forecasting Frequency Before SEOs
Disclosure Measure: Management Forecasts
Dependent Variable: Proportion of GN Sum of SRET
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
SEO 0.456∗∗∗ 5.46 0.004 0.91
SEOFIRM 0.118∗∗∗ 2.86 0.009 1.58
SEOFIRM × SEO 0.093 0.74 −0.008 −1.25
SEOFIRM × SEO × POSTREFORM 0.645∗∗∗ 4.06 0.017∗∗ 2.14
SEO × POSTREFORM −0.651∗∗∗ −7.27 −0.001 −0.18
SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM −0.073 −1.33 −0.003 −0.46
POSTREFORM −0.008 −0.04 −0.011 −0.88
MTB 0.001 0.37 0.001∗∗ 2.51
ANALYST FOLLOWING 0.007 1.45 0.000 0.75
LSIZE 0.003 0.15 −0.002 −1.08
ROA 1.219∗∗∗ 3.68 −0.022 −0.57
LNOWN 0.018 1.07 0.000 −0.34
INST HOLDING 0.040 0.53 −0.007 −1.48
LNPRC 0.049∗ 1.70 0.008∗∗∗ 3.55
Year Indicators Included Included
Industry Indicators Included Included
R 2 9.0% 2.7%
No. of observations 4,651 4,651
Panel B: Analysis of Press Release Frequency Before SEOs
Disclosure Measure: Firm-Initiated Press Releases
Dependent Variable: Proportion of GN Sum of SRET
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
SEO 0.689∗∗∗ 5.70 −0.013 −1.45
SEOFIRM 0.055 1.38 0.015 1.44
SEOFIRM × SEO 0.003 0.02 0.009 0.65
SEOFIRM × SEO × POSTREFORM 0.740∗∗ 2.51 0.044∗∗ 2.03
SEO × POSTREFORM −0.074 −0.41 0.002 0.16
SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM −0.017 −0.30 0.016 0.90
POSTREFORM −0.117 −0.59 −0.003 −0.09
MTB −0.001 −0.23 0.002∗∗ 2.56
ANALYST FOLLOWING 0.003 0.61 0.002∗∗ 2.25
LSIZE −0.084∗∗∗ −3.02 −0.012∗∗∗ −2.70
ROA 0.561 0.83 0.151 1.50
LNOWN −0.006 −0.28 0.003 1.15
INST HOLDING −0.271∗∗∗ −2.76 −0.010 −0.74
LNPRC 0.175∗∗∗ 3.80 0.028∗∗∗ 4.21
Year Indicators Included Included
Industry Indicators Included Included
R 2 8.4% 4.4%
No. of observations 4,651 4,651
This table presents the results from estimating equation (2) in the paper. In panel A (B), the Proportion
of GN is the annualized number of good news forecasts (press releases) relative to the number of bad news
forecasts (press releases) in the pre-SEO window, and in the neighboring windows, where a disclosure is
considered to provide good (bad) news if it induces a positive (negative) cumulative abnormal return in the
three-day window [–1, 1] around the disclosure date. Sum of SRET in panel A (B) is the aggregate cumulative
abnormal returns in the three-day window [–1, 1] around forecast announcements (press releases) in the
pre-SEO window and in the neighboring windows. The other variables are as defined in the notes in tables
2 and 3. Year Indicators are indicator variables for all but one of the years in our sample. Industry Indicators
are indicator variables for all but one of the 48 industries in Fama and French [1997]. The standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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the end of the fiscal quarter preceding the SEO filing date. The coef-
ficient of interest in equation (3) is β8, which captures the relation be-
tween pre-SEO disclosures and post-SEO abnormal returns following the
Reform.
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (3). We find
that the coefficient estimate for β5 is statistically insignificant for both
forms of disclosure and both measures of good news. That is, we find no
evidence that the pre-SEO disclosures are associated with post-SEO abnor-
mal stock returns before the Reform. Further, table 5 shows that the coef-
ficient estimate for β8 is also statistically insignificant for both forms of dis-
closure and both measures of good news. And, the results from our F-tests
suggest that the sum of the coefficient estimates for β5 + β8 in equation
(3) is insignificantly different from zero in all our regression specifications
(untabulated). These results indicate that there is no evidence that pre-SEO
good news forecasts or press releases are associated with post-SEO return
reversals.
Although we find no statistically significant evidence of market-
conditioning behavior after the Reform, we note that the coefficient for
SEOFIRM × DISC × POSTREFORM (i.e., β8) is insignificantly negative in
three of the four regressions, pointing in the direction of hyping. Given
that our tests are based on a small number of observations (i.e., 1,484 ob-
servations) and that abnormal returns are measured with significant noise,
the above tests might lack sufficient power to detect market-conditioning
behavior. As a result, we suggest some caution interpreting these
results.
Conditional on our tests having sufficient power, the absence of any rela-
tion between pre-SEO disclosures and post-SEO returns could be because
either managers do not attempt to condition the market before SEOs or
investors debias managers’ disclosures once they learn of the firm’s inten-
tion to raise equity. To further investigate whether firms attempt to condition
the market following the Reform, we examine (1) whether analyst forecasts
issued during the pre-SEO period are systematically more optimistic than
they are in the neighboring windows and those issued for control firms,
and (2) whether management forecasts are systematically greater than pre-
ceding analyst forecasts in the pre-SEO period relative to the neighboring
periods and that of control firms. The idea is that, if managers are trying to
condition the market before SEOs, they are likely to bias their disclosures
upwards to influence analysts to be more optimistic about the firms’ future
prospects.
We find no statistically significant evidence of market-conditioning be-
havior in either of the tests described above (results are tabulated in table
OA1 in the online appendix). However, we again note that the coefficient
accruals. We then follow the procedure in Kothari, Leone, and Wasley [2005] to calculate the
performance-adjusted discretionary accruals.
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TA B L E 5
Analyses of Abnormal Returns Following SEOs
Panel A: Management Forecasts
Dependent Variable: 18-Month Abnormal Returns (AR)
Disclosure Measure (DISC): Proportion of GN Sum of SRET
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
SEOFIRM −0.072∗∗ −2.01 −0.075∗∗ −2.06
DISC −0.015 −0.58 0.003 0.10
POSTREFORM −0.068 −0.46 −0.052 −0.35
SEOFIRM × DISC 0.017 0.47 0.015 0.42
SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM −0.008 −0.14 −0.006 −0.11
DISC × POSTREFORM 0.008 0.21 −0.002 −0.05
SEOFIRM × DISC × POSTREFORM 0.039 0.70 −0.004 −0.08
QABRET −0.116∗∗∗ −3.42 −0.119∗∗∗ −3.48
LSIZE 0.000 0.02 −0.001 −0.06
MTB 0.000 0.08 0.000 0.05
ROA 0.551∗ 1.66 0.563∗ 1.69
PDA −0.192∗ −1.74 −0.190∗ −1.72
FREQ 0.001 0.08 0.000 0.02
Year Indicators Included Included
Industry Indicators Included Included
R 2 11.3% 11.1%
No. of observations 1,484 1,484
Panel B: Press Releases
Dependent Variable: 18-Month Abnormal Returns (AR)
Disclosure Measure (DISC): Proportion of GN Sum of SRET
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
SEOFIRM −0.047∗∗ −2.09 −0.048∗∗ −2.16
DISC 0.009 0.61 0.023 1.29
POSTREFORM −0.094 −1.04 −0.092 −1.01
SEOFIRM × DISC 0.016 0.74 −0.016 −0.71
SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM 0.031 0.90 0.035 1.03
DISC × POSTREFORM −0.026 −1.11 −0.033 −1.21
SEOFIRM × DISC × POSTREFORM −0.024 −0.70 −0.012 −0.35
QABRET −0.078∗∗∗ −3.68 −0.078∗∗∗ −3.56
LSIZE 0.010 1.54 0.009 1.48
MTB −0.003 −1.47 −0.003 −1.47
ROA 0.717∗∗∗ 3.48 0.714∗∗∗ 3.46
PDA −0.119∗ −1.72 −0.116∗ −1.68
FREQ 0.000 0.12 0.000 0.21
Year Indicators Included Included
Industry Indicators Included Included
R 2 14.4% 14.6%
No. of observations 1,484 1,484
This table presents the results from estimating equation (3). AR is the abnormal returns in the 18 months
following the SEO issuance date (see figure 2). DISC is the Proportion of GN or Sum of SRET, where Proportion
of GN is the number of good news forecast announcements (press releases) relative to the number of bad
news forecast announcements (press releases) in the pre-SEO window and Sum of SRET is the sum of the
abnormal returns in the forecast announcement (press release) windows in the pre-SEO period reported
in panel A (B). We demean DISC to center the variable on zero. SEOFIRM is an indicator variable that
equals one for the SEO firm sample, and zero for the matched firm sample. POSTREFORM is an indicator
variable that equals one if the SEO filing date is after 2005, and zero otherwise. QABRET is the cumulative
abnormal returns in the three months immediately preceding the SEO filing date, where abnormal return
is the firm’s return minus the return of the CRSP value-weighted index. LSIZE is the natural logarithm
of market value of equity measured at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date.
MTB is market-to-book ratio of equity measured at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO
filing date. ROA is return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items scaled by total
assets at the fiscal quarter-end immediately preceding the SEO filing date. PDA is performance-adjusted
discretionary accruals, measured at the fiscal quarter before the SEO filing date. FREQ is the number of
forecast announcements (press releases) in the six months before the SEO filing date. The standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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for SEOFIRM × DISC × POSTREFORM is insignificantly positive in three
of eight regressions we estimate, which points in the direction of pre-SEO
hyping behavior. As a result, here again it is plausible that these tests do
not have sufficient power to identify market-conditioning behavior. In sum-
mary, our results suggest that offering firms do not use pre-SEO disclosures
to condition the market following the Reform. However, the increase in the
frequency of good news disclosures before SEOs suggests that firms show
more willingness to reveal positive business prospects after the Reform and
that firms are more likely to raise capital when they have good news (e.g.,
new growth opportunities).
5.3 THE EFFECT OF REFORM ON INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
In this section, we examine whether pre-SEO information asymmetry is
reduced following the 2005 Reform using the following regression:
INFO ASYMit = β1 + β2SEOFIRMi + β3SEOit + β4POSTREFORMt
+β5SEOFIRMi × SEOit + β6SEOFIRMi × POSTREFORMt
+β7SEOit × POSTREFORMt + β8SEOFIRMi × SEOit
×POSTREFORMt +
∑
γControls + εit ,
(4)
where INFO ASYM is either ASC Spread, Market Depth, or Analyst Forecast Ac-
curacy. ASC Spread is the adverse selection component of average daily bid-
ask spread. Market Depth is the daily average of each quote’s depth, calcu-
lated as the sum of the dollar offer size and the dollar bid size. Analyst
Forecast Accuracy is the average analyst earnings forecast accuracy. All other
variables are as defined earlier. The coefficients of interest in equation (4)
are β5 and β8, where β5 captures the pre-SEO information asymmetry be-
fore the Reform, and β8 captures the change in pre-SEO information asym-
metry following the Reform.
Table 6 presents the results from estimating equation (4). The coeffi-
cient estimate for β5 is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level
when ASC Spread is the dependent variable, and is negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level when Market Depth and Analyst Forecast Accuracy
are the dependent variables. These results suggest that pre-SEO informa-
tion asymmetry was abnormally high before the Reform, and is associated
with the decrease in voluntary disclosure frequency in the pre-SEO period
before the Reform as observed in table 3. This is consistent with the quiet
period before SEOs providing incentives for investors to acquire private
information.24
24 Note that we do not examine the direct association between the change in pre-SEO dis-
closure after the Reform and the change in pre-SEO information asymmetry after the Reform
because we do not expect the sensitivity of information asymmetry to changes in disclosure to
be affected by the Reform. Rather, our prediction is that there will be greater pre-SEO disclo-
sure and a corresponding decrease in pre-SEO information asymmetry. In other words, in a
regression of information asymmetry on disclosure frequency, we do not expect the coefficient
for disclosure frequency to change after the Reform. Instead, we expect any decrease in the
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Table 6 also shows that the coefficient for β8 is negative (positive) and
statistically significant at the 5% level when ASC Spread (Market Depth; An-
alyst Forecast Accuracy) is the dependent variable, suggesting that the relax-
ation of gun-jumping restrictions helps reduce information asymmetry in
the preoffering period. Further, the results from F-tests (untabulated) sug-
gest that the sum of the coefficients for β5 and β8 in equation (4) is insignif-
icantly different from zero (p-value = 0.80, 0.89, and 0.78 for spread, depth,
and forecast accuracy, respectively), indicating that, after the Reform,
pre-SEO information asymmetry reduces to that observed in other (non-
SEO) periods.25
In terms of economic magnitudes, our coefficients suggest that,
ASC Spread increases by approximately 15% in pre-SEO periods before the
Reform and decreases by approximately 16.7% in pre-SEO periods after
the Reform (i.e., to ASC Spread levels observed in non-SEO periods). Sim-
ilarly, Market Depth and Analyst Forecast Accuracy decrease by approximately
7.4% and 13.4% in pre-SEO periods before the Reform and return to nor-
mal levels observed in non-SEO periods after the Reform. Taken together,
these results suggest that, after the Reform, firms increased their pre-SEO
disclosure frequency, which is associated with a decrease in pre-SEO infor-
mation asymmetry.
5.4 THE EFFECT OF THE REFORM ACROSS WKSIS AND NON-WKSIS
The Reform creates a new class of equity offering firms—WKSIs. To qual-
ify for WKSI status, a firm must be current and timely in filing mandatory
reporting requirement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (i.e., its
10-K filing, 10-Q filing, etc. must be up to date). Further, the firm must ei-
ther have $700 million of worldwide public common equity float or have is-
sued in the immediately preceding three years $1 billion of nonconvertible
securities, other than common equity, in registered offerings for cash. The
SEC argues that WKSIs are large firms that are “well known” and widely fol-
lowed by sophisticated market participants, and, thus, the investors in these
firms need less regulatory protection.
The key regulatory benefit concerning pre-SEO disclosures afforded to
WKSIs is that they are allowed any communication, including Section 5(c)
“offers,” any time prior to the filing of a registration statement (Rule 163).
In contrast, non-WKSIs are allowed to release any information as long as
it is more than 30 days before the registration statement is filed and the dis-
closure does not reference the equity offering (Rule 163A). However, dis-
closures by non-WKSIs in the 30 days immediately before SEO filing run
level of information asymmetry after the Reform to be achieved via an increase in disclosure
frequency rather than a change in the coefficient on disclosure.
25 In additional analyses (see table OA5 in the online appendix), we partition SEO firms
into those increasing good news disclosures before SEOs and those increasing bad news dis-
closures before SEOs and reestimate our information asymmetry tests. We find that our results
hold for both subsamples of firms, thereby further supporting the notion that good news dis-
closures are not hyping.
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 1329
the risk of the SEC interpreting them as an “offer” under Section 5(c) of
the Securities Act (see the appendix for a detailed discussion). Thus, dis-
closures by non-WKSIs in the 30-day period before SEO filing are subject to
greater litigation risk than their disclosures outside the 30-day window and
the disclosures of WKSIs.
We use this regulatory distinction between WKSIs and non-WKSIs intro-
duced in the Reform to further refine our tests and better identify the
relation between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry. Specif-
ically, if the Reform causes firms to increase the amount of information
conveyed before SEOs, and thus reduces pre-SEO information asymmetry,
we should observe that WKSIs increase disclosure up to the SEO filing date,
whereas non-WKSIs do not increase disclosure in the 30-day pre-SEO win-
dow; rather, non-WKSIs increase disclosure up until the 30 days before SEO
filing.
We classify an issuer as a WKSI if its market capitalization is more than
$700 million in the year prior to its equity offering. Although our criterion
to identify WKISs is imperfect, the SEC also uses market capitalization as
a proxy for public float in evaluating the $700 million threshold and its
implications. Further, the SEC states that “ . . . very few issuers that . . . did
not meet the $700 million public float threshold would meet the $1 billion
nonconvertible securities threshold . . . or have issued at least $1 billion in
non-convertible securities for cash in the past three years” (SEC [2005],
p. 30). Nevertheless, we verify the robustness of our inferences to using
a variety of cutoffs to identify WKSIs (non-WKSIs) ranging from a market
capitalization of $700 million to $900 million ($700–$550 million).
Table 7 presents our results examining the impact of the Reform on
forecast and press release frequencies for WKSIs and non-WKSIs, where
the 90-day pre-SEO window is broken into a [–90, –31] day period before
the SEO filing and a [–30, –1] day period before the SEO filing.26 Panel
A (B) examines pre-SEO forecasting (press release) frequency. We find
no evidence that WKSIs decrease their disclosure frequency in the [–90,
–31] day period before SEO filing both before and after the enactment of
the Reform. We also find no evidence of a change in disclosure frequency
over the same pre-SEO period following the enactment of the Reform.27 In
contrast, non-WKSIs significantly reduce their disclosure frequency in the
26 As mentioned earlier, we annualize disclosure frequencies for all windows to facilitate
comparison.
27 Note that ex ante it is unclear whether WKSIs are likely to decrease their disclosure fre-
quency in the [–90, –31] day window before SEO filing in the pre-Reform period. WKSIs are
large firms that are likely to have greater demand from analysts and investors. Further, they
have more experience raising capital and closer ties to investment bankers (SEC [2005]), so
they have the ability to file their registration statement with the SEC quicker than non-WKSIs,
leading to shorter quiet periods. To the extent that the [–90, –31] day window encompasses
the period before the quiet period for WKSIs, we might not empirically observe a decrease in
disclosure frequency before the Reform in the [–90, –31] day window.
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[–90, –31] day period before SEO filings in the pre-Reform period, but fol-
lowing the Reform, they significantly increase disclosure in the [–90, –31]
day period before SEO filings. The behavior of non-WKSIs is consistent with
gun-jumping provisions reducing incentives to disclose information in the
pre-Reform regime and a change in these incentives following the Reform.
Importantly, we find that both WKSIs and non-WKSIs significantly reduce
disclosure frequency in the [–30, –1] day period before SEO filing in the
pre-Reform period, consistent with the incentives induced by gun-jumping
restrictions; further, only WKSIs increase their disclosure frequency in the [–30,
–1] day period before SEO filing after the enactment of the Reform. Collectively,
these results provide strong evidence that the Reform impacts the pre-SEO
disclosure behavior of SEO firms.28
Finally, we examine whether changes in pre-SEO information asymme-
try for WKSIs and non-WKSIs are associated with changes in disclosure be-
havior. Table 8, panel A (B, C), presents the results when we measure in-
formation asymmetry using ASC Spread (Market Depth; Analyst Forecast Accu-
racy). We find that the Reform has no effect on information asymmetry for
WKSIs in the [–90, –31] day period before SEO filings either before or
after the Reform, which is consistent with the absence of any change in dis-
closure frequency in these periods (see table 7). In contrast, we observe a
significant increase in information asymmetry for non-WKSIs in the [–90,
–31] day period before SEO filings in the pre-Reform period and a signif-
icant decrease in information asymmetry in the same period following the
Reform, which is again consistent with the change in disclosure frequency
for non-WKSIs in these periods (see table 7). Further, table 8 shows that
both WKSIs and non-WKSIs have significantly higher information asymme-
try in the [–30, –1] day period before SEO filing in the pre-Reform pe-
riod. However, following the Reform, WKSIs observe a significant decrease
in information asymmetry in the [–30, –1] day period before SEO filing.
In contrast, non-WKSIs see no such decrease in information asymmetry.
Here again, changes in pre-SEO information asymmetry are associated with
changes in pre-SEO disclosure frequency for both WKSIs and non-WKSIs.
Collectively, these results provide strong evidence that the Reform signifi-
cantly affects the pre-SEO disclosure behavior, and thus the pre-SEO infor-
mation asymmetry of equity offering firms.29
28 Interestingly, we note that the coefficient for SEOFIRM × SEO × POSTREFORM is negative
(albeit insignificant) for WKSIs in the [–90, –31] day window after the Reform. This coefficient
suggests that WKSIs perhaps shifted some of their disclosures from the [–90, –31] day window
to the [–30, –1] day window after the Reform to minimize information asymmetry immediately
before the SEO. However, given that the coefficients are insignificant at conventional levels,
we are cautious drawing any inference.
29 Note that, while we have differential predictions for WKSIs and non-WKSIs in our infor-
mation asymmetry tests, we do not have differential predictions for our return reversal tests,
good news disclosure frequency tests, and SEO announcement returns tests (see section 5.5
for the announcement return test). Therefore, we do not tabulate separate results for the
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5.5 THE EFFECT OF THE REFORM ON THE COST OF FINANCING
Prior research finds robust evidence that firms experience a 2%–3%
decline in the price of their shares at SEO announcements (e.g., Asquith
and Mullins [1986], Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald [1991], Ritter
[2003], Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli [2007], Lee and Masulis [2009], Gao
and Ritter [2010]). The negative SEO announcement return is interpreted
as evidence of adverse selection concerns; that is, the announcement
indicates that the firm’s equity is not undervalued, and perhaps is overval-
ued (see, e.g., Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli [2007], Lee and Masulis [2009],
Gao and Ritter [2010], among others). The intuition is that managers
are more likely to issue equity as the current stock price rises relative to
its intrinsic value (Myers and Majluf [1984], Krasker [1986]). Rational
investors recognize managers’ information advantage and interpret an
SEO announcement as management’s opinion that the stock is not under-
valued, which should reduce the stock’s market price because the right tail
of the market price’s probability distribution (i.e., stock undervaluation) is
being truncated.
By limiting disclosure before the announcement of an SEO, gun-
jumping regulation prevented investors from evaluating a firm’s true
financial health, thereby increasing information asymmetry. To the extent
that the Reform allows firms to provide more disclosure immediately before
SEOs and reduce information asymmetry before the announcement of the
SEO, the Reform is likely to reduce the negative SEO announcement effect
(i.e., the adverse selection cost), and thus the cost of raising capital. We
estimate the following difference-in-differences regression to test our
prediction:
ANN CARit = β1 + β2SEOFIRMi + β3POSTREFORMt + β4SEOFIRMi
×POSTREFORMt +
∑
γControls + εit ,
(5)
where ANN CAR is the three-day cumulative market-adjusted return around
the SEO announcement date.30 Since non-SEO firms do not have an SEO
announcement, we use the three-day window that we use to compute
ANN CAR for SEO firms for its matched control firm. The other variables
WKSI and non-WKSI firms for these tests. That said, for the sake of completeness, we do con-
duct these tests, and continue to find no evidence that either WKSIs or non-WKSIs condition
the market after the Reform. And, we find that both WKSIs and non-WKSIs observe a negative
stock price reaction to SEO announcements prior to the Reform and a reduction in the nega-
tive reaction after the Reform, consistent with a cost of capital reduction for both sets of firms
after the Reform. These results are tabulated in table OA4 in the online appendix.
30 We follow prior research (e.g., Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch [1993], Purnanandam
and Swaminathan [2006]) and use the SEO filing dates to proxy for the announcement dates,
since SEO announcement dates are not readily available in SDC. Purnanandam and Swami-
nathan [2006] check a random sample of 300 SEOs and find that approximately 90% of the
firms made their SEO announcement on the SEO filing date. The remaining SEO announce-
ments were within a day of the filing date.
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TA B L E 9
SEO Announcement Returns Before and After the Reform
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Return Around SEO Announcement
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
SEOFIRM −0.0212∗∗∗ −8.23 −0.0221∗∗∗ −8.59
SEOFIRM × POSTREFORM 0.0070∗∗ 2.39 0.0094∗∗∗ 3.38
POSTREFORM −0.0043 −0.82 −0.0060 −1.07
MTB −0.0003 −1.18 −0.0004 −1.36
ANALYST FOLLOWING 0.0000 0.11 0.0000 0.07
LSIZE −0.0010 −0.65 −0.0014 −0.69
ROA −0.0150 −0.76 −0.0214 −0.84
LNOWN 0.0004 0.34 0.0003 0.24
INST HOLDING 0.0011 0.18 −0.0002 −0.03
LNPRC 0.0059∗∗ 2.46 0.0077∗∗ 2.41
SALES GR 0.0000 −0.50
SALE −0.0014 −0.27
LEVERAGE 0.0028 0.34
CAPEX 0.0521∗∗ 2.24
CASH 0.0000 0.00
PRE RETURN −0.0003 −0.36
SHARE PER −0.0044∗ −1.70
SEC OFFER −0.0039 −1.21
Year Indicators Included Included
Industry Indicators Included Included
R 2 7.5% 8.2%
No. of observations 1,534 1,480
This table presents the results from estimating equation (5). The dependent variable is the three-day
cumulative market-adjusted return around the SEO announcement date for both SEO firms and their
control firms. SEOFIRM is an indicator variable that equals one for the SEO firm sample, and zero for the
matched firm sample. POSTREFORM is an indicator variable that equals one if the SEO filing date is after
2005, and zero otherwise. SALES GR is the percentage change in sales, CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled
by assets, CASH is cash holdings scaled by assets, PRE RETURN is the buy-and-hold returns in the 12 months
preceding SEO filing, SHARE PER is the number of shares issued as a percentage of shares outstanding,
SALE is the firm’s sales scaled by assets, LEVERAGE is the sum of short- and long-term debt scaled by assets,
and SEC OFFER is an indicator variable equal to one if the SEO contains secondary shares. The other control
variables are as defined in the notes in tables 2 and 3. Year Indicators are indicator variables for all but one
of the years in our sample. Industry Indicators are indicator variables for all but one of the 48 industries in
Fama and French [1997]. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical
significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
are as defined previously. In addition to controlling for all the variables
included in our earlier regressions, we follow prior research (see, e.g.,
Choe, Masulis, and Nanda [1993], Jung, Kim, and Stulz [1996], Purnanan-
dam and Swaminathan [2006]) and also control for the following variables:
SALES GR—the percentage change in sales, CAPEX—capital expenditures
scaled by assets, CASH—cash holdings scaled by assets, PRE RETURN—buy-
and-hold returns in the 12 months preceding SEO filing, SHARE PER—the
number of shares issued as a percentage of shares outstanding, SALE—firm
sales scaled by assets, LEVERAGE—the sum of short- and long-term debt
scaled by assets, and SEC OFFER—an indicator variable equal to one if
the SEO contains secondary shares. The inclusion of additional control
variables leads to the loss of 54 observations due to missing data. The
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coefficient of interest in equation (5) is β4, which captures the average
change in SEO announcement returns following the Reform incremental
to that for matched non-SEO firms.
Column 1 in table 9 presents the results from estimating a baseline model
that includes only the control variables used in prior analyses. Column 2 in
table 9 presents the full model that includes the additional control vari-
ables described above. The table shows that the coefficient for SEOFIRM
(β2) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating the
stock price of an SEO firm drops by approximately 2.1% at the announce-
ment. This negative reaction is consistent with a long line of prior research
(see Ritter [2003] and Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli [2007] for surveys of
the literature). Importantly, we find that the coefficient estimate for β4 is
positive and statistically significant, indicating that the SEO announcement
return is less severe after the Reform. Specifically, we find that the SEO an-
nouncement return is 0.7 percentage points less negative, which provides
additional support for the notion that there is a reduction in information
asymmetry before SEO announcements, and hence the cost of issuing eq-
uity capital following the Reform.
6. Conclusion
In 2005, the SEC enacted the Securities Offering Reform, which relaxes
gun-jumping disclosure rules before equity offerings. The SEC argues that
these rules restrict valuable information flow to investors around a highly
important corporate event (SEC [2005]). The SEC believes that the relax-
ation of these restrictions will increase the flow of information from firms to
investors, and consequently reduce information asymmetry. However, op-
ponents of the Reform argue that the gun-jumping restrictions are meant
to protect investors from managers’ incentives to condition the market be-
fore offerings, and that the relaxation of these restrictions will lead to mar-
ket conditioning.
This paper examines the impact of the Reform on offering firms’ volun-
tary disclosure behavior and the associated economic consequences. Using
a matched-sample difference-in-differences research design, we document
a disproportionate increase in the number of forecasts and press releases in
the preoffering period after the enactment of the Reform. We then exam-
ine whether the increased disclosure is associated with market conditioning
or a reduction in information asymmetry. Consistent with the SEC’s intent,
we find that preoffering information asymmetry decreases following the Re-
form. Moreover, we find no evidence of managers conditioning the market
after the Reform.
In addition to informing the debate as to the impact of the Reform,
this paper contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by examin-
ing the effect of a quasi-exogenous shock to voluntary disclosure before
equity offerings. By using unique features of our setting, such as the fo-
cus on quiet periods (where private information acquisition is likely high),
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a direct cost of (raising) capital, and the Reform’s regulatory disclosure
distinction between WKSIs and non-WKSIs, we greatly enhance our empiri-
cal identification of the relation between voluntary disclosure and informa-
tion asymmetry.
APPENDIX
A.1. Summary of Restrictions on Pre-Filing Period Communication
Before the Reform
Section 5(c) of the 1933 Securities Act restricts firms from making an
“offer” to sell a security during the Pre-Filing Period (i.e., period before a
registration statement is filed with the SEC). However, the Securities Act is
ambiguous about both what constituted an “offer” and when the Pre-Filing
Period begins, thus providing the SEC considerable flexibility in enforcing
the rules. In particular, SEC Release No. 5180 notes simply that the Pre-
Filing Period begins once the company is “in registration” and ends at the
filing date.
|——————————————————————————————|
“in registration” filing
No Safe Harbors
Similarly, the Securities Act is ambiguous about the meaning of the term
“offer.” The SEC has long held the view that the term “offer” is broader
than communication including an explicit offer of securities for sale. In
the SEC’s view, “offer” encompasses all communications that may “condi-
tion the market” for the securities (see case 38 SEC 843 (1959), in the Mat-
ter of Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., February 9, 1959). For example, in a May
2004 interview, the CEO of Salesforce.com, a provider of customer rela-
tionship management software, told a reporter that “the S.E.C. prohibits
me from making any statements that would hype my IPO.” The CEO also
discussed “the software business and his competitors.” His statements were
subsequently released in a New York Times article. The SEC deemed these
communications as conditioning the market even though the firm did not
explicitly offer to sell securities to the public.31 More generally, Choi and
Pritchard [2008, Chapter 7] state that any soft information, such as projec-
tions of revenue or profits (even if directed toward the firms’ customers),
can be construed as conditioning the market by the SEC.
This vague guidance has become problematic for Exchange Act report-
ing issuers who face both periodic disclosure requirements (e.g., 10-Ks and
10-Q) and a constant stream of questions from financial analysts and the
investing public. Since the consequences of violating gun-jumping can be
31 See Laurie J. Flynn and Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Salesforce.com Is Said to Delay Its Public
Offering,” New York Times, May 19, 2004.
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severe,32 the surrounding uncertainty as to what constitutes an “offer” has
in practice forced many issuers to be much more restrictive in their com-
munications before offerings than was ever intended by the Securities Act
(SEC [2005]). Further, firms’ conservative disclosure directly conflicts with
the SEC’s push in recent years for reporting companies to make ongoing
real-time public disclosures of material information concerning their busi-
nesses. The 2005 Securities Offering Reform is intended to address these
competing objectives. In particular, the safe harbors in the Reform clarify
when firms are considered to be “in registration” and are more explicit on
what constitutes an “offer.”
A.2. Summary of the Pre-Filing Period Safe Harbors Implemented in
the Reform
“in registration” 30 days prior to filing filing
Safe Harbors introduced in the Reform
| Rule 163A (WKSI & non-WKSI)
Rule 168 (WKSI & non-WKSI)
Rule 163 (WKSI only)
|
|
|
|
32 Violation of gun-jumping restrictions can cause the SEC to impose a significant delay in
the offering or the purchasers of the securities in the offering may acquire a one-year rescission
right.
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Who benefits from the safe harbors?
Issuer Type Brief Definition of Issuer Type Applicable Safe
Harbors
Nonreporting
issuers
Issuers that are not required to file Exchange
Act reports (e.g., 10-Ks, 10-Qs, etc.) and are not
filing such reports voluntarily.
 Rule 163A
 Rule 169
Unseasoned issuers
and seasoned issuers
Unseasoned issuers are issuers that are required
to file Exchange Act reports but do not satisfy
the requirements to use a Form S–3 or Form
F–3 for a primary offering of its securities.
Seasoned issuers are issuers that are eligible to
use Form S–3 or Form F–3 to register primary
offerings of securities. Form S-3 is the most
simplified securities registration form used by
the SEC. It may only be used by companies that
have been required to report under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for a minimum
of 12 months and have also timely filed all
required reports (including 10-Ks, 10-Qs, and
8-Ks) during the 12 calendar months and any
portion of a month immediately before the
filing of the registration statement. Form F-3 is
used by certain foreign private issuers that have
a global market capitalization greater than $75
million and that have reported under the 1934
Act for a minimum of 12 months.
 Rule 163A
 Rule 168
Well-known
seasoned issuers
–(WKSIs)
Seasoned issuers that (1) have at least $700
million in worldwide market capitalization held
by nonaffiliates or (2) have issued $1 billion in
aggregate principal amount of nonconvertible
securities in registered offerings during the past
three years and will register only
“nonconvertible securities, other than common
equity, and full and unconditional guarantees.”
If such an issuer has a public float of $75 million
in common equity at the determination date, it
can also issue common equity as a WKSI (Choi
and Pritchard [2008], p. 425).
 Rule 163A
 Rule 168
 Rule 163
Brief Description of the Safe Harbors
Rule 163A: Prior to the Reform, there was some ambiguity as to when the
Pre-Filing Period began. The start date of the Pre-Filing Period is important
because companies in the Pre-Filing Period enter into a quiet period dur-
ing which a company and others associated with the offering run the risk of
violating gun-jumping provisions (i.e., Section 5(c)) if they communicate
about the offering or the company’s future prospects. Rule 163A provides
a safe harbor for the issuer clarifying when the Pre-Filing Period begins.
Specifically, communications made by the issuer, or those working on be-
half of an issuer (other than an underwriter or dealer participating in the
offering), prior to 30 days before the filing of the registration statement
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with the SEC are excluded from the definition of an “offer” for purposes of
Section 5(c). To be eligible for the safe harbor, the communication should
not refer to the offering.
Rule 163: Rule 163 exempts both oral and written communications, includ-
ing “offers,” from Section 5(c) during the Pre-Filing Period. (Underwriters
and dealers participating in the offering are prohibited from using Rule
163.) Issuers that use Rule 163 to exempt written communication from Sec-
tion (c) must treat such communications as “free writing prospectuses.” A
free writing prospectus is any written communication that offers to sell or
solicits an offer to buy a security that is (or will be) subject to a registra-
tion statement and that does not meet the requirements of a Section 10
statutory prospectus.
Rule 168: Rule 168 allows most Exchange Act reporting issuers (and those
working on their behalf, other than underwriters and dealers participating
in the offering) to continue the regular release of “factual business informa-
tion” and “forward-looking information.” Information in periodic reports
(e.g., a 10-K) and other materials filed with the SEC are included within
the safe harbor. Factual business information includes, among other things,
factual information about the issuer and its business, advertisements of the
issuer’s products or services, and factual information contained in the is-
suer’s periodic Exchange Act reports. Forward-looking information that is
permitted includes financial projections, statements about the issuer man-
agement’s plans and the issuer’s future economic performance, and any
underlying assumptions. Allowing reporting issuers the ability to publish or
disseminate certain forward-looking information during a public offering is
a dramatic change from the SEC’s hostile attitude toward forward-looking
information set forth in prior SEC Releases. Although Rule 168 provides
an exemption from Section 5(c)’s prohibition on offers in the Pre-Filing
Period, an important prerequisite to using Rule 168 is that the issuer must
have “previously released or disseminated” the same type of information in
the “ordinary course of its business” and the information must be “mate-
rially consistent in timing, manner and form” with the issuer’s similar past
releases or disseminations of such information (see Rule 168(d)).33 The
safe harbor does not cover information relating to the offering itself.
Rule 169: Rule 169 of the Securities Act allows for the continuing disclo-
sure of “factual business information” by or on behalf of non-Exchange
Act reporting issuers (i.e., most IPO issuers). Rule 169 provides an exemp-
tion from Section 5(c)’s prohibition on “offers” in the Pre-Filing Period.
33 If an issuer shifts an existing advertising campaign from a trade journal into the Wall Street
Journal during the prefiling period, the issuer might not be able to rely on Rule 168 because
the disclosure might not be perceived as “materially consistent in timing, manner, and form”
with the issuer’s past releases.
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However, Rule 169 does not exempt forward-looking information from the
definition of an offer. (Information relating to the offering is also ineligi-
ble.) Since our paper concerns publicly listed firms that comply with Ex-
change Act reporting requirements, this safe harbor does not apply to the
firms in our sample.
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